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Opponents of trade liberalization have
sought to indict free trade and trade agree-
ments by painting a grim picture of the eco-
nomic state of American workers and
households. They claim that real wages
have been stagnant or declining as millions
of higher-paying middle-class jobs are lost
to imports. But the reality for a broad swath
of American workers and households is far
different and more benign.
Contrary to public perceptions:
• Trade has had no discernible, negative
effect on the number of jobs in the U.S.
economy. Our economy today is at full
employment, with 16.5 million more
people working than a decade ago.
• Trade accounts for only about 3 per-
cent of dislocated workers.Technology
and other domestic factors displace far
more workers than does trade.
• Average real compensation per hour
paid to American workers, which in-
cludes benefits as well as wages, has in-
creased by 22 percent in the past decade.
• Median household income in the
United States is 6 percent higher in
real dollars than it was a decade ago
at a comparable point in the previous
business cycle. Middle-class house-
holds have been moving up the
income ladder, not down.
• The net loss of 3.3 million manufac-
turing jobs in the past decade has
been overwhelmed by a net gain of
11.6 million jobs in sectors where the
average wage is higher than in manu-
facturing. Two-thirds of the net new
jobs created since 1997 are in sectors
where workers earn more than in
manufacturing.
• The median net worth of U.S. house-
holds jumped by almost one-third
between 1995 and 2004, from $70,800
to $93,100.
The large majority of Americans,
including the typical middle-class family,
is measurably better off today after a
decade of healthy trade expansion.
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Executive Summary
Introduction
Although economists since Adam Smith
have explained how free trade raises the wealth of
nations and the material well-being of their citi-
zens, many Americans—arguably a majority—
remain skeptical. Their doubts are reinforced by
politicians and commentators who point to jobs
lost to imports from low-wage countries and sta-
tistics that seem to indicate that living standards
for a majority of Americans are not improving.
Specifically, the critics of trade and globaliza-
tion state as a matter of fact that the real wages
earned by most American workers have been
stagnant or in decline for decades. They claim
that higher-paying manufacturing and white-
collar jobs are being destroyed by imports and
outsourcing, while the jobs left behind are
lower-paying service jobs such as flipping ham-
burgers or cashiering at big-box retailers. In the
verdict of public opinion, trade and globalization
are held partly if not primarily responsible for
the perceived loss of jobs, downward pressure on
wages, and a middle class under siege.
Beyond dispute is the fact that the U.S.
economy is more open and globalized than
ever before. Two-way trade in goods and ser-
vices and outward and inward flows of foreign
investment have reached record levels. Since
the mid-1960s, imports as a share of gross
domestic product have jumped from 6 percent
to 22 percent, while exports have grown from 6
percent to 16 percent.1 In the past two decades,
the U.S. government has enacted such trade-
expanding legislation as the North American
Free Trade Agreement with Canada and
Mexico, membership in the World Trade
Organization, and permanent normal trade
relations with China. What is debatable is how
the U.S. economy and American workers and
households have fared in this period of
expanding engagement in the global economy.
Skeptics of trade and even some supporters
paint a bleak but unjustified picture of current
conditions. At a February 2007 hearing before
the House Committee on Education and Labor,
Richard Trumka, secretary-treasurer of the
AFL-CIO, testified, “Despite strong economic
statistics for the U.S. economy overall, the vast
majority of Americans are struggling to maintain
their living standards in the face of stagnating
wages, rising economic insecurity, eroding health
care and retirement benefits and mounting debt.
At the richest moment in our Nation’s history,
the American dream is fading for the majority of
American workers.”2
In an essay in the July/August 2007 edition
of Foreign Affairs, titled “A New Deal for
Globalization,” pro-trade economists Kenneth
F. Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter cite figures
that imply that wages have not grown since
2000 for a large majority of American workers
and warn of a coming backlash against trade.
“U.S. policy is becoming more protectionist
because the American public is becoming more
protectionist, and this shift in attitudes is a
result of stagnant or falling incomes. Public
support for engagement with the world econo-
my is strongly linked to labor-market perfor-
mance, and for most workers labor-market
performance has been poor.”3
What is the real story on jobs, living stan-
dards, and the middle class in the United
States today, and what role has expanding
international trade played in the changing
number, composition, and compensation of
American workers? This study finds that much
of the anxiety expressed about trade, jobs, and
living standards is not supported by the evi-
dence. Among the key findings:
• Trade has had no discernible, negative
effect on the number of jobs in the U.S.
economy. Our economy today is at full
employment, with 16.5 million more
people working than a decade ago.
• Trade accounts for only about 3 percent
of dislocated workers. Technology and
other domestic factors displace far more
workers than do changing patterns of
trade.
• Average real compensation per hour for
American workers, which includes bene-
fits as well as wages, has increased by 22
percent in the past decade.
• American workers today can buy a wider
array of affordable goods because of trade.
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• Median household income in the United
States is 6 percent higher in real dollars
than a decade ago at a comparable point
in the previous business cycle.
• Middle-class households have been mov-
ing up the income ladder, not down. The
share of U.S. households earning between
$35,000 and $75,000 in real dollars has
been gradually shrinking over the years,
but so too has the share of households
earning less than $35,000, while the share
earning more than $75,000 continues to
grow.
• The net loss of 3.3 million manufacturing
jobs in the past decade has been over-
whelmed by a net gain of 11.6 million
jobs in sectors where the average wage is
higher than in manufacturing.Two-thirds
of the net new jobs created since 1997 are
in sectors where workers earn more than
in manufacturing.
• The net worth of American households
and nonprofit organizations jumped 85
percent between 1996 and 2006, from
$30 trillion to $56 trillion.
• The median net worth of U.S. households
rose by almost one-third between 1995
and 2004, from $70,800 to $93,100.
• Thanks to lower interest rates delivered in
part by more open global capital markets,
American households have not experienced
any significant increase from a decade ago
in debt payments as a share of family
income. The debt ratio in 2004 was 14.4
percent, up only slightly from 14.1 in 1995.
By any reasonable measure, American work-
ers and families are better off now than during
comparable periods in the past, and expanding
engagement in the global economy has played
an important role in the ongoing, upward trend
in American employment and living standards.
Trade and Jobs:
Why Both Sides Are Wrong
Trade is not about more jobs or fewer jobs,
but about better jobs. Advocates of trade liberal-
ization who claim that lower barriers boost the
total number of jobs in our economy are as
wrong as skeptics who argue that lower barriers
mean fewer jobs. During the debate over
NAFTA in 1993, people on both sides were
guilty of this fundamental mistake. Independent
presidential candidate H. Ross Perot famously
predicted that passage of the agreement would
create “a giant sucking sound” as jobs and invest-
ment headed south across the border. Advocates
of the agreement, including the Clinton White
House, countered that NAFTA would create
hundreds of thousands of net new jobs. Both
sides were wrong to the extent they predicted a
net change in jobs either way.
Trade does cause certain jobs to disappear,
certain companies to go out of business, and
certain sectors of the economy to shrink. That
is what we would expect from increased com-
petition, domestic as well as international. But
trade as a rule does not affect the total number
of jobs or the overall rate of employment or
unemployment. Studies that claim that trade
expansion, trade deficits, or trade agreements
have caused the loss of some specific number of
jobs during a certain period of time are mis-
leading if they imply that today’s economy has
that many fewer jobs than it would have other-
wise. Trade does not affect the total number of
jobs in an economy for three reasons.
Trade: A Net Wash on Total Employment
First, if workers, capital, and resources can
shift within the domestic economy, jobs elimi-
nated by import competition will quickly be
replaced by jobs created elsewhere. Focusing
merely on jobs lost because of imports ignores
the offsetting jobs that trade and globalization
create through other channels. One channel is
expanding exports, as U.S. producers ramp up
production to meet demand abroad as well as at
home. Trade competition also reduces costs for
U.S. producers by allowing them to buy raw
materials, intermediate inputs, and capital
machinery at lower, more competitive global
prices. Lower producer costs translate into high-
er profits, attracting more investment and creat-
ing more employment in those sectors that ben-
efit from open markets.Trade also delivers lower
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prices on imported consumer goods, giving
households more money to spend on domestic
goods and services, stimulating further employ-
ment gains. Globalization also means more
international investment flowing into the
United States. Inward foreign direct investment
creates jobs by establishing foreign-owned pro-
duction facilities in the United States, while
inflows of financial capital create jobs by reduc-
ing long-term interest rates, thus promoting
greater investment and job creation by domestic
companies.
Second, the much-misunderstood reality of
comparative advantage means that our economy
will always be globally competitive in a range of
sectors. If we lose our competitive edge in one
sector or industry, because of shifting technolo-
gy and factor prices or the emergence of new
global competitors, the competitive edge of
other sectors will be enhanced. The insight of
comparative advantage, first expounded by
David Ricardo in 1817, is that a country will
tend to export what it can make more efficient-
ly relative to what else it could produce domes-
tically given its own endowment of resources.
Another country may (in theory, anyway) be
able to produce everything at a lower per unit
cost than we can produce domestically, but we
can still gain from exchanging what each coun-
try is relatively most efficient at producing. If the
United States loses its shoe industry to lower-
cost global competition, the reality of compara-
tive advantage means that we will likely gain
competitiveness and export share in pharmaceu-
ticals, civil aircraft, financial services, and other
sectors where we are relatively more efficient
than making shoes.We may lose call center jobs,
where we are relatively less efficient, but gain
jobs in financial analysis or computer engineer-
ing. American workers will always be relatively
more productive in some sectors than others in
the domestic economy, ensuring that we will
always be competitive in a range of global export
markets.
Third, trade tends not to affect the overall
number of jobs because of other, more power-
ful and counterbalancing factors in the broader
economy such as monetary policy and foreign
exchange rates. If a surge in imports did cause
widespread layoffs in certain sectors, the result-
ing increase in unemployment would push the
Federal Reserve to tilt toward a looser mone-
tary policy and lower interest rates to stimulate
the overall economy. Increased imports would
also have the effect of pumping more dollars
into international markets, causing the dollar
to depreciate on foreign currency markets. A
weaker dollar, in turn, would make U.S. exports
more attractive, stimulating employment in
export sectors while dampening demand for
imports, thus offsetting initial jobs losses.
In the same way, if trade restrictions could
somehow artificially stimulate employment in
certain sectors, driving unemployment below
its normal rate, the Federal Reserve would like-
ly move in the opposite direction, tightening
monetary policy and credit to prevent over-
heating and potential inflation. Higher interest
rates, in turn, would cool other sectors of the
economy, offsetting the initial job gains from
protection. Higher barriers to imports would
also constrict the number of dollars flowing
into international markets, causing the dollar
to appreciate above the exchange rate that
would have prevailed without the trade barriers
in place. The stronger dollar would dampen
international demand for our exports and stim-
ulate demand for imports, again offsetting any
short-term employment gains in the protected
sectors. For all those reasons, changes in trade
flows have not determined the overall level of
employment in the U.S. economy.
Even the most cursory glance at the
employment numbers during recent decades
should dispel any fear that trade and globaliza-
tion threaten overall employment. Across the
decades, against a backdrop of rising levels of
trade and repeated business cycles, a central
truth has stood out: In the long run, job growth
in the United States tends to track growth in
the labor force. As new workers have entered
the labor market, U.S. producers have found
profitable ways of employing them. Job growth
invariably reverses during recessions, but then
catches back up with labor-force growth dur-
ing expansions, driving the unemployment rate
back down to a level consistent with “full
employment.”
4
Even the most 
cursory glance at
the employment
numbers during
recent decades
should dispel any
fear that trade and
globalization
threaten overall
employment.
In the past four decades, during a time of
expanding trade and globalization, the U.S.
workforce and total employment have each
roughly doubled. As Figure 1 shows, total
employment has closely followed labor-force
growth. Since 1965, the number of people
employed in the U.S. economy has increased
from 71.1 million to 146.1 million, while the
number in the civilian labor force has grown
from 74.5 million to 153.2 million—both
growing at an identical annual rate of 1.73 per-
cent. Total employment will stall and even
reverse during recessions, but will invariably
resume its upward climb as the economy recov-
ers. Despite fears of lost jobs, total employment
in the U.S. economy has grown by 16.5 million
since 1997, 46.8 million since 1980, and 75.0
million since 1965.4 After four decades of
demographic upheaval, technological transfor-
mations, dramatically rising levels of trade, and
half a dozen recessions and recoveries, the cur-
rent unemployment rate of 4.6 percent is virtu-
ally the same as it was in 1965.5 Obviously, an
increasingly globalized U.S. economy is per-
fectly compatible with a growing number of
jobs and full employment.
Trade’s Small Role in “Job Churn”
Expanding international trade does elimi-
nate a certain number of jobs each year. We
often see that reality in the news media and
sometimes in our own communities: an auto-
parts supplier downsizes its workforce, an appar-
el factory closes its doors, a telecommunications
firm outsources a call center to India. Affected
workers are real people with bills to pay and
dependents to support. But the number of peo-
ple dislocated from their jobs each year because
of shifting trade patterns is relatively small in
America’s dynamic market economy where “job
churn” is a normal, healthy fact of life.
The number of workers who lose their jobs
because of expanding trade, outsourcing, and
businesses moving offshore probably falls in
the range of 300,000 to 500,000 each year.The
Economic Policy Institute, a left-of-center
research organization in Washington, claimed
in a 2001 paper that rising imports had elimi-
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U.S. Employment Grows with Labor Force
Source: Economic Report of the President, 2002.
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nated 3 million “actual and potential jobs” from
1994 to 2000—an average of 500,000 per
year.6 In a more recent study, EPI claimed that
our economy lost 200,000 jobs a year just from
trade with China in the past decade.7 Lori
Kletzer, in a 2001 study for the Institute for
International Economics, estimated that trade
accounted for 320,000 job losses annually from
1979 to 1999.8 Even if we accept the highest of
those figures, jobs lost because of expanding
trade are a relatively small component of the
underlying churn in the U.S. labor market.
Every year, the U.S. economy creates and
destroys millions of jobs. According to the U.S.
Department of Labor, an average of 32.1 mil-
lion jobs were created and 30.4 million were
eliminated annually between 1992 and 2006,
creating an average annual net job gain of 1.7
million.9 About half the churn is seasonal, but
the other half is permanent, meaning that each
year about 15 million jobs disappear, never to
be seen again.10 If changing flows of trade
account for the loss of 500,000 jobs a year,
trade would be responsible for about 3 percent
of the overall churn in the labor market.
Job displacement because of expanding trade
also appears small when compared to weekly fil-
ings for unemployment compensation. If the
estimates of job losses from trade expansion are
correct, about 10,000 workers lose their jobs in a
typical week because of trade-related causes.
That provides plenty of sound bites and televi-
sion images for the critics of trade. And yet, in a
typical week, even when the economy is hum-
ming, more than 300,000 people will file claims
for unemployment insurance. By that yardstick
as well, workers displaced by expanding trade
account for only 3 percent of total displaced
workers.
What accounts for the other 97 percent of
job turnover? Technology probably accounts for
most permanent job displacement. For example,
introduction of the personal computer 25 years
ago has eliminated hundreds of thousands of
jobs for typists, secretaries, and telephone oper-
ators. The daily newspaper business has seen
venerable papers close their doors and hundreds
of thousands of reporting, editing, and produc-
tion positions eliminated because of the migra-
tion of readers and advertising to the Internet.
Kodak, the camera company headquartered in
Rochester, New York, has laid off 30,000 work-
ers since 2004—not because of unfair trade by
foreign competitors, but because of the prolifer-
ation of digital cameras and plunging sales of
film. Tower Records shut down its U.S. stores
and laid off workers, not because of imports, but
because iPods and other digital-music devices
have cut deeply into sales of compact discs.
Workers also lose their jobs because of
changing consumer tastes and domestic market
competition as one American company cuts
into the market share of another. There is
nothing unique or disturbing about the fact
that changes in international trade account for
a small share of job displacement in the U.S.
labor market.
Trade, like technology, affects the type of
jobs in our economy but not the total number.
If workers and capital can move freely between
states and between sectors, jobs lost in one area
will tend to be replaced by jobs created in
another. The overall number of jobs depends
on the growth rate of the economy and labor
force, business investment, the flexibility of
employers to hire or lay off workers, and other
broader factors. A nation open to the global
economy can enjoy low unemployment, just as
a country with a closed economy can suffer
high unemployment, and vice versa. It is sim-
ply wrong to blame trade for causing a net loss
of jobs or anything other than a small fraction
of job displacement.
Real Wages,
Better Compensation
Critics of trade respond that our economy
may be creating enough jobs, but the new jobs
pay less than the jobs being destroyed. The
result is stagnant or falling real wages and liv-
ing standards and a shrinking middle class.
Typical is the assertion of Sen. Sherrod Brown
(D-OH) in his 2004 book, Myths of Free Trade:
“The median real wage—the level at which 50
percent of the country’s wage earners are above
and 50 percent of the country’s wage earners
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are below—in the United States has been stag-
nant over the last twenty-seven years. Compare
that stagnation of wages among half the popu-
lation with the period from 1946–1973, when
the average U.S. wage increased by 80 per-
cent.”11
In their Foreign Affairs article, economists
Scheve and Slaughter stated that, between
2000 and 2005, “more than 96 percent of U.S.
workers are in educational groups for which
average money earnings have fallen.” The only
educational groups that saw their wages rise
during that period were the 4 percent of work-
ers with a PhD, MBA, JD, or MD, creating
what the authors called an “astonishing skew-
ness of U.S. income growth.”12 In his 2000
book The Race to the Bottom, Alan Tonelson
wrote that, since 1973, “three quarters of the
U.S. workforce, not a small group of losers, has
experienced declining living standards, and
today’s globalization policies bear much
responsibility.”13
The belief that most American workers are
earning less than in years past rests on a faulty
understanding of how trade affects the econo-
my and living standards and a misinterpreta-
tion of recent wage and income data. Greater
freedom to trade, in practice as well as theory,
has helped to lift the wages and incomes of
most Americans to levels above what they
would be had markets remained closed.
Contrary to the common tale, expanding levels
of trade in recent decades have been accompa-
nied by rising real hourly compensation for
American workers and a higher median
income for households.
How Trade Raises Wages
Trade raises the general wage level by
expanding opportunities for Americans to
work in sectors where productivity and pay
exceed the average. Because of comparative
advantage, American workers tend to be most
productive in the sectors that are most capital
intensive—that is, the sectors requiring large
investments in physical and human capital and
intellectual property. Examples of such indus-
tries are pharmaceuticals; chemicals; civilian
aircraft; sophisticated machinery; microproces-
sors; and professional services in finance, insur-
ance, accounting, and other sectors. Those
industries also tend to pay higher-than-average
wages. As the more competitive industries
expand output and employment, the overall
wage level tends to rise as they compete in the
labor market to hire new workers.
Americans find it hardest to compete inter-
nationally in sectors that are relatively labor
intensive, such as toys, sporting goods, shoes,
and apparel.Those industries tend to pay lower-
than-average wages. As the American economy
opens itself to global competition, we tend to
import more of the labor-intensive goods,
reducing relative employment in lower-paying
sectors, while we export more of the capital-
intensive goods, promoting greater employment
in higher-paying sectors. Thus expanding trade
tends to raise overall wage and income levels.
Even for the majority who work in nontrade
sectors, global competition delivers lower prices
for everyday consumer goods, allowing workers
to stretch their paychecks further.
Yet official statistics show that the average
real hourly wage paid to American workers is
lower today than in the 1970s. From a peak of
$8.99 an hour in 1972, the average real wage
(in 1982 dollars) declined steadily to a low of
$7.52 in 1993 before rising again to $8.32 dur-
ing the first half of 2007.14 The statistic that
the average real wage remains below its peak of
more than 30 years ago has become a rhetori-
cal battering ram against trade liberalization,
but it fails to capture the reality of the progress
Americans have made in a more globalized era.
The Unreality of the Real Wage Data 
The average real wage is a fundamentally
flawed measure of the well-being and progress
of American workers, for three reasons: First,
the real wage does not include benefits. Second,
it relies on cost-of-living estimates that have
tended to systematically overstate inflation in
recent decades and thus understate gains in real
earnings. Third, real wage numbers are often
compared to previous peak years, a practice that
tends to minimize longer-term upward trends.
By excluding benefits, the real wage data
underplay the real gains made by American
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workers.Although money wages remain a major-
ity of total compensation, benefits have grown as
a share of the average worker’s compensation
package. Those benefits help Americans pay for
medical care and retirement. More companies
than in decades past are also offering dental and
eye care benefits, more generous paid leave, and
matching 401(k) contributions. The average real
wage numbers fail to capture those real benefits.
A more accurate measure of earnings is “real
hourly compensation,” which includes not only
wages but benefits. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics data on wages and benefits combined
tell a more accurate and encouraging story about
the well-being of the average American worker.
Since 1973, average real hourly compensation
for American workers has increased 45 percent,
for an average annual growth rate of more than
1.1 percent.15 Figure 2 shows that real hourly
compensation has not only climbed since 1973,
but its rise has accelerated in the past decade
along with America’s growing economic open-
ness.The average American worker has not suf-
fered from “stagnant” earnings in the past three
decades but in fact has enjoyed real gains.
Even the more comprehensive compensa-
tion numbers tend to understate the real gains
American workers have enjoyed in recent
decades. Economists have long realized that the
Consumer Price Index tends to overstate the
cost of living compared with past years because
it often fails to accurately capture the increased
quality of new and improved products. As
Michael Cox and Richard Alm explained in
their 1999 book, Myths of Rich and Poor, new
products do not show up in the CPI shopping
cart until several years after they have become
popular with consumers. For example, pocket
calculators were not added until 1978, VCRs
until 1987, and cell phones until 1998 (by
which time nearly 40 percent of households
already owned one).16 That means the CPI fails
to capture the steep price declines that often
mark new electronic consumer goods as they
become ubiquitous.
The inability of the CPI to fully capture such
advancements means that the rise in the cost of
living (i.e., inflation) has been systematically
overstated. In the mid-1990s, a number of stud-
ies attempted to measure the upward bias of the
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Real Wages vs. Real Compensation, 1954–2007
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CPI. Estimates ranged from 0.5 percent a year
to 1.7 percent per year. Falling in the middle of
the range was the official Advisory Commission
to Study the Consumer Price Index, known less
formally as the Boskin Commission. In a report
in December 1996, it determined that the CPI
had overstated inflation by 1.1 percent per year.
That may seem a small amount, but compound-
ed over years and decades, such a bias can have
a large impact on real wages or compensation,
leading to a significant understatement of the
real purchasing power of U.S. wages today com-
pared with the past.
Thanks in no small part to international
trade, American workers today benefit from an
ever expanding and improving array of products
on which they can spend their paychecks. In the
mythical golden era of 1973, the average
American worker earning a supposedly higher
real wage could not buy a microwave oven; a
personal computer; a cell phone; a laser printer;
a CD, DVD, or MP3 player; an iPod, digital
camera, or camcorder; or a car with air bags and
anti-lock breaks.17 When we fully account for
benefits as well as wages and the wider and more
useful array of products we can buy today, the
average American worker is much better com-
pensated than his counterpart in decades past.
Selective Comparisons, Wrong Base Years
Yet another major problem with how wage
and income figures are handled in the trade
debate is the selective use of base years. Wages,
like household income, business profits, and
net worth, tend to rise and fall with the busi-
ness cycle. A trend can be made to appear more
negative than it really is by comparing the cur-
rent level with a base year that represents a
cyclical peak. In the same way, a trend can be
made to look more positive by comparing the
current level with a base year in the trough of a
recession. The most accurate, underlying
trends can best be discerned by comparing
years at similar stages of the business cycle—
peak to peak, trough to trough, or somewhere
in between.
It is no coincidence that critics of trade, or
their unwitting fellow travelers, almost always
compare current economic conditions with
those in 2000 or 1973. Both those years repre-
sent economic peaks that were followed the
next year by recessions. Both years, in hind-
sight, are atypical and thus provide misleading
benchmarks for judging current conditions.
The year 1973 marked the final sprint of a
Nixon-era, election-cycle expansion fueled by
easy monetary policies and wage and price con-
trols that kept inflation temporarily bottled up
(only to have it explode into double digits in
1974). The price controls caused real wages to
appear deceptively high that year, making it a
misleading benchmark on which to judge subse-
quent years. Similarly, 2000 marked the fevered
peak of a remarkable decade long-expansion
fueled by real productivity gains but also hyper-
charged by the dot.com bubble that began to
deflate in March of that year. Choosing either of
those years as a benchmark will tend to mini-
mize whatever economic progress has been
made in the years that followed.
Today’s average real wage tends to look
weak in comparison with 2000 not because
trade and globalization are weighing down the
earnings of Americans but because we are still
climbing back out of the cyclical downturn of
2001. Recent hikes in energy prices have also
bitten into real wage growth, offsetting pro-
ductivity gains fueled in part by increasing
trade and globalization.
A more objective and accurate measure of
economic trends results from comparing cur-
rent conditions with those at a similar stage of
previous business cycles. According to the
National Bureau of Economic Research, the
U.S. economy has suffered five recessions since
the early 1970s—in 1974–75, 1980, 1981–82,
1991, and most recently 2001.18 The right
benchmark for current conditions is not the
peak year of 2000, but the comparable year in
the previous cycle when the economy was at
the same stage of recovery from recession as it
is today. We are now seven years removed from
the most recent cyclical peak of 2000, so the
comparable year in the previous cycle would be
1997, also seven years removed from the previ-
ous peak year of 1990. In the same way, the
right benchmark for 2006 data should be 1996,
and for 2005 data 1995.
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In that light, the real hourly compensation
and even the flawed real wage data look much
more benign: In the decade since 1997, as the
U.S. economy has become more globalized,
real compensation per hour for American
workers has risen by 22 percent. More remark-
ably, the growth in real hourly compensation
has accelerated in the past decade, rising at an
annual rate of 2 percent compared with an ane-
mic annual rise of 0.7 percent between 1973
and 1997. Even the average real wage—despite
the overstatement of inflation and omission of
benefits—was 8.2 percent higher in mid-2007
than 10 years ago.19
Growth of Middle-Class Service Jobs
Behind the rise in average real wages and
compensation is a changing mix and growing
number of middle-class service jobs. The com-
mon story is that trade has caused the loss of
well-paying, mostly unionized, middle-class
manufacturing jobs while the service economy
creates mostly lower-paying jobs in food service
or retail.While some better-paying manufactur-
ing jobs have indeed disappeared, the trend in
recent decades has been for lower-paying facto-
ry jobs to be replaced by better-paying service
jobs. In a 2004 speech on “Trade and Jobs,” the
current chairman of the Federal Reserve Board,
Ben Bernanke, informed a North Carolina
audience, “During the 1990s, average earnings
in manufacturing industries that showed net
declines in employment (weighted by the num-
ber of job losses) were $10.63 per hour. During
the same period, wages in expanding service-
providing industries (weighted by the number of
jobs gains) were $11.26 per hour, about 6 per-
cent higher.”20
That pattern has continued through the cur-
rent decade. Between 1997 and the first half of
2007, the U.S. labor market did in fact shed a net
3.3 million manufacturing jobs, but that has
been overwhelmed by a net gain of 11.6 million
jobs in sectors where the average wage is higher
than in manufacturing (see Table 1). Education
and health services alone added 4.1 million jobs
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Table 1
More Jobs, Better Paying Jobs
Average
Number of Jobs (1,000s) Wage
Employment Sector 1997 2007 Change % Change (2007)
Utilities 621 551 -70 -11 $27.60
Information 3,084 3,090 6 0 $23.85
Natural resources and mining 653 714 61 9 $20.80
Construction 5,813 7,679 1,866 32 $20.74
Professional and business services 14,333 17,848 3,516 25 $19.86
Financial activities 7,178 8,451 1,273 18 $19.51
Wholesale trade 5,663 5,974 311 5 $19.36
Education and health services 14,088 18,221 4,133 29 $17.82
Transportation and warehousing 4,026 4,521 495 12 $17.56
Subtotal 55,459 67,049 11,590 20.9
Manufacturing 17,418 14,086 -3,332 -19 $17.12
Trade, transportation, and utilities 24,700 26,423 1,723 7 $15.68
Other services 4,825 5,466 641 13 $15.09
Retail trade 14,390 15,376 987 7 $12.74
Leisure and hospitality 11,016 13,474 2,458 22 $10.24
Subtotal 54,931 60,739 5,808 10.6
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
between 1997 and 2007. Another net 3.5 mil-
lion new jobs were created in the professional
and business service sector, 1.9 million in con-
struction, and 1.3 million in financial activi-
ties—all sectors where average wages are signif-
icantly higher than in manufacturing.21 In total,
two-thirds of the net new jobs created in the
past decade are in sectors where the average
wage is higher than in manufacturing.
Granted, the number of jobs also grew in ser-
vice sectors that pay less than manufacturing,
but such jobs accounted for only a third of the
net new jobs created in the past decade. The
growth rate of jobs in the lower-paying service
sectors in the past decade was only half the
growth rate of jobs in the better-paying service
sectors. Jobs added in the lower-paying retail
trade, leisure, and hospitality sectors—including
flipping burgers and cashiering at big-box retail-
ers—accounted for less than a quarter of the
nonmanufacturing jobs added in the past
decade. Manufacturing jobs really are being
replaced by service jobs in our economy, but two
of every three new jobs are in sectors that pay
more than the typical manufacturing job.
Despite the mythologizing about manufac-
turing jobs, the American middle class today
earns its keep from better-paying service-sector
jobs. Knock on doors in a typical middle-class
American neighborhood and you will meet peo-
ple who work, not in factories, but in the service
sector: teachers, managers, carpenters, architects,
engineers, computer specialists, truck drivers,
loan officers, vocational counselors, public rela-
tions specialists, automotive service technicians,
accountants and auditors, police officers and fire
fighters, insurance and real estate agents, regis-
tered nurses, physical therapists, dental hygien-
ists and other health care professionals, and self-
employed business owners. These are the occu-
pations that now form the backbone of the
American middle class.22
Rising real wages and compensation during
the past decade pose a serious challenge to the
“trade is making us worse off ” thesis. If we are to
believe that expanding trade and competition
with low-wage countries have eliminated high-
paying manufacturing jobs and depressed the
earnings of U.S. workers, how do the critics of
trade explain the remarkable labor-market gains
of the past decade? Since 1997, during a period
of rapidly increased trade and globalization, the
number of workers employed in the U.S. econo-
my jumped by more than 16 million, while the
unemployment rate is now slightly below what
it was a decade ago at a similar stage in the busi-
ness cycle. And those employed workers, as
we’ve seen, are earning significantly higher real
hourly compensation than workers a decade ago
when the U.S. economy was less globalized.
That record is not an indictment of more liber-
al trade but a vindication.
A Middle-Class Service
Economy
A related theme repeated by critics of trade
is that global competition has “squeezed” the
American middle class. Large sections of Lou
Dobbs’s latest book, The War on the Middle
Class, are devoted to criticizing trade expansion
as a major battle front. As trade and globaliza-
tion destroy higher-paying manufacturing jobs,
the story goes, the great American middle class
finds itself shrinking and in threat of disap-
pearing altogether.
As with the employment and wage data,
truth about the size and state of the American
middle class has become another casualty of
anti-trade propaganda. America remains a
solidly middle-class country, with a large and
growing number of middle-class households
earning their living in the service sector. To the
extent that trade has affected the middle-class
job market, it has tended to create better-pay-
ing jobs while eliminating lower-paying jobs.
Real household income in America, like real
hourly compensation, has continued to trend
upward through the downs and ups of recur-
ring business cycles.
The Upward Trend in Household Incomes
Opponents of trade expansion frequently
compare the latest median household income
figures with those of the year 2000, making the
same mistake we often see with the wage and
job figures. But when compared with previous
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years at similar stages in the business cycle, the
latest household income numbers fail to provide
any support for dire warnings about a shrinking
middle class or declining household income.
According to the most recent numbers from
the U.S. Census Bureau, the median income of
America’s 116 million households was $48,201
in 2006. That figure was indeed lower than the
median income of $49,163 earned in the peak
year of 2000. But the more accurate benchmark
should be 1996, which (like 2006) occurred six
years after the previous cyclical peak. By that
more objective benchmark, 2006 median house-
hold income was up 6.1 percent from the
$45,416 figure of a decade ago. (All income fig-
ures are expressed in real 2006 dollars.)23
The positive trend in household income
probably understates the living-standard gains
of individuals within households. The average
number of people per U.S. household has been
declining for decades because of the growth of
single-parent households; the greater number of
young, single people living outside their parents’
home before they marry; more elderly widows;
and fewer children per family. Between 1970
and 2005, the average number of people per
household fell from 3.2 to 2.6. That means the
higher incomes earned by today’s households are
supporting fewer members, allowing even more
purchasing power per person. After a decade of
expanding trade and globalization, American
households, like individual workers, are earning
more. There is no reason to believe that trend
will not continue.
As Figure 3 shows, median household
income fluctuates with the business cycle but
trends upward overall. Like the waves of an
incoming tide, household incomes retreat dur-
ing recessions, then climb back during the
recovery and expansion to eventually exceed the
previous peak, only to repeat the cycle. During
the previous three business cycles, median
household income fell an average of 4.7 percent
from peak to trough, and remained below the
peak for an average of five years.24 The most
recent trend in household income is following a
long-established pattern. Opponents of trade
liberalization who dwell on the fact that house-
hold income is still below the 2000 peak confuse
a temporary cyclical dip with the ongoing, long-
term progress enjoyed by American households.
Behind the “Shrinking” Middle Class
The American middle class is not disappear-
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Figure 3
Median Household Income, 1970–2006
Note: Shaded areas mark recessions.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.
ing but moving up. According to the Census
Bureau, 32.8 percent of American households
earned a middle-class income between $35,000
and $75,000 in 2006. That share of households
was indeed down slightly from the 33.8 percent
that fit the definition of middle class in 1996.
But if the middle class has been shrinking, it is
not because more families have been squeezed
by globalization and other pressures into lower
income brackets. The share of households earn-
ing below $35,000 also shrank during the past
decade, from 39.6 percent to 36.7 percent.
Meanwhile, the share of households earning
$75,000 or more jumped from 26.5 percent to
30.4 percent.25
If we define middle class more broadly, say
$35,000 to $100,000, or $25,000 to $75,000, or
$25,000 to $100,000, the same pattern emerges:
The middle class continues to slowly shrink over
time, while the share of households earning less
also shrinks and the share earning more contin-
ues to grow. The great American middle class
has been shrinking not because more house-
holds have slipped down the income ladder but
because more have moved up.
Contributing to that upward mobility has
been the growth of two-earner households.
Some critics decry the trend of women joining
the workforce as another negative result of
globalization, claiming that the alleged down-
ward pressure on wages has forced wives and
mothers to leave home for the workplace to
help the family pay its bills. But this argument
ignores the ample evidence that real hourly
compensation and the number of higher-pay-
ing service-sector jobs have been rising over
time, not falling. Critics also ignore the many
positive reasons why so many women have
decided since the 1970s to work outside the
home for pay. Those reasons include growing
levels of education among women, growing
career opportunities in the expanding service
sector, and the wider availability of labor-sav-
ing appliances and prepared foods that have
reduced labor demands at home—reasons that
have nothing to do with globalization and a
“middle-class squeeze.”
Most women have always worked, whether
in the home or in an office or factory.The differ-
ence today compared to four or five decades ago
is that a significantly larger share now get paid in
dollars in the labor market, which has expanded
the financial opportunities of American families.
As Cox and Alm observed in their book, Myths
of Rich and Poor, “When men went to work out-
side the home, the family’s living standards rose
because of the tremendous gains from specializa-
tion and exchange. Why do we insist that the
same transition for women can only mean a
pinch on households’ possibilities? It makes no
sense to suggest that the economic rules flip-flop
when a second adult takes a job. Working
women are a sign that families are making them-
selves better off, not slipping toward poverty.”26
America remains a solidly middle-class
country. A majority of Americans see them-
selves as middle class. They earn middle-class
incomes and lead middle-class lives. Through
recurring business cycles and the changing
composition of employment, median house-
hold income has trended upward as a rising
number of families move into the middle-class
and an even larger number move to the upper-
income brackets. Expanding trade and global-
ization have played a positive role in helping
Americans make the transition to a middle-
class service economy.
An Explosion of 
Household Wealth
Even if American workers and middle-class
families have seen their standard of living
improve during a time of increased globaliza-
tion, the critics say it has come at the expense
of the household balance sheet. At a January
2007 congressional hearing on the middle
class, Yale University professor Jacob Hacker
testified that middle-class families with chil-
dren “are drowning in debt,” noting that “in
2004, personal debt exceeded 125 percent of
income for the median, married couple with
children.”27 Another witness, citing similar
numbers, concluded that, “Declining wealth
and fewer savings pose significant risks to mid-
dle-class families facing unemployment. The
weakest job growth rate since the Great
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Depression means that people who lost their
job had a much harder time finding jobs than
before.”28
Those witnesses, like most other critics of the
recent era of trade expansion, miss the real pic-
ture of how American households have accumu-
lated wealth during an era of unprecedented
integration in the global economy. Globalization
and trade expansion have not only helped
American families improve their cash flow
through new and better-paying jobs, those
trends have also helped Americans boost their
net worth through the accumulation and appre-
ciation of household assets.The median amount
of debt held by American households has
indeed risen in the past decade, but the amount
of assets those families hold has increased even
more rapidly, nearly doubling the net worth of
American households in the past decade.
Globalization has helped to boost the net
worth of American households, first, by raising
household income above what it would be with-
out expanded trade and, second, by expanding
Americans’ opportunity to tap into global capi-
tal markets directly and indirectly. Along with
growing trade in goods and services, recent
decades have seen an expanding flow of capital
across international borders. Outward foreign
investment has boosted returns for U.S. compa-
nies that invest abroad as well as for individual
and institutional U.S. investors who have added
foreign holdings to their portfolios. Inward for-
eign investment has created well-paying jobs for
American workers while bidding up the value of
real estate, business, and financial assets held by
American households. According to a recent
study by the National Bureau of Economic
Research, foreign capital flowing into the
United States reduces long-term domestic inter-
est rates by almost a full percentage point below
what they would be if we had to rely solely on
domestic savings to fund investment.29 Lower
interest rates, in turn, have boosted asset prices
while lowering borrowing costs and debt-service
payments.
Recent decades of expanding trade and glob-
alization have helped American households sig-
nificantly improve their balance sheets. Accord-
ing to the Federal Reserve Board’s quarterly Flow
of Funds report, the net worth of American
households and nonprofit organizations jumped
85 percent between 1996 and 2006, from $30.1
trillion to $55.6 trillion. Household liabilities did
increase during the past decade,but by an amount
that remained comfortably below the increase in
assets. From 1996 to 2006, total liabilities of U.S.
households and nonprofit organizations grew
from $5.4 trillion to $13.3 trillion, an increase of
$7.9 trillion that was dwarfed by the $33.3 trillion
increase in the value of assets.
Between 1996 and 2006, the value of real
estate held by U.S. households more than dou-
bled, from $8.3 trillion to $20.6 trillion; the
value of bonds and bank and money-market
fund deposits rose from $5.8 trillion to $9.7
trillion; and holdings of stocks, mutual fund
shares, pension fund reserves, equity in noncor-
porate businesses, and other equity assets rose
from $20.0 trillion to $34.4 trillion, despite the
sharp stock-market correction of 2000–2002.30
The increase in net wealth since the mid-1990s
has not been confined to the rich, but has been
broadly shared by the middle class. According to
the most recent Survey of Consumer Finances, the
median net worth of U.S. households jumped by
almost one-third between 1995 and 2004, from
$70,800 to $93,100. Households earning in the
middle quintile saw their median net worth
increase from $57,100 to $72,000,an increase of 26
percent, and those in the second income quintile
from the top saw their net worth jump from
$93,600 to $160,000, a 71 percent increase.
Despite public worries about retirement insecurity
and loss of pension benefits,U.S.households head-
ed by workers aged 55–64 had a median net worth
in 2004 of $248,700—a 75 percent improvement
from the net wealth of similar households that
were nearing retirement a decade before.31
The proportion of families owning their
primary residence and retirement accounts
both increased in the past decade. From 1995
to 2004, the share of all families that owned
their own homes increased from 65 to 69 per-
cent, and home ownership among families in
the middle-income quintile increased even
more, from 63 to 72 percent. Ownership of
retirement accounts also increased in the same
period, from 45 to almost 50 percent among all
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families and 48 to 53 percent among those in
the middle-income quintile.32
A closer look at the balance sheet of
American households shows that families have
not been “drowning in debt” nor have they been
borrowing just to pay for daily necessities.
According to the Survey of Consumer Finances,
72 percent of the debt Americans incurred in
2004 went toward the purchase or improvement
of a primary residence, virtually identical to the
share in 1995. Another 9.5 percent went to the
purchase of other residential property and 6.7
percent to the purchase of vehicles, both down
only slightly from 1995 levels. Another 3 per-
cent of debt was incurred to finance education,
up slightly from 1995. Only 6 percent of the
new debt taken on by U.S. households in 2004
was used to pay for consumption of goods and
services, up just slightly from the 5.6 percent so
used in 1995.33 A majority of U.S. households,
according to the survey, had no credit card debt
in 2004.34
Thanks to lower interest rates delivered in
part by more open global capital markets,
American households are spending about the
same share of their income on debt payments
as they were a decade ago. On average, U.S.
households spent 14.4 percent of their family
income on debt payments in 2004, not signifi-
cantly different from the 14.1 percent spent in
1995. The share of families with a debt ratio
above 40 percent did not change much either,
increasing from 11.7 to 12.2 percent.35
Clearly American families are not drowning
themselves in debt to pay for groceries or even
big screen televisions.They are borrowing to buy
homes and durable goods. If debt has risen com-
pared to income, more than three quarters of the
new debt has been used to purchase real estate
assets that have risen in value even more sharply
than liabilities.The debt ratio of the typical fam-
ily has remained stable because of the rising
incomes and lower interest rates that a more
open U.S. economy has helped to deliver.
During the past decade of increased trade
and globalization, a broad swath of American
households have seen their net worth rise along
with real hourly compensation and household
income. In contrast to the grim picture painted
in the media and the hearings rooms of
Congress, American families have emerged
from the most recent recession with more
wealth and spending power than a decade ago.
Conclusion
The anecdotes and skewed comparisons used
to argue against trade liberalization are contra-
dicted by the actual progress that American
workers and families have made in the past
decade. According to all the major indicators of
economic and financial well being, Americans are
better off than they were at a comparable point in
the previous expansion. As Table 2 summarizes,
16.5 million more Americans are working than a
decade ago and the rate of unemployment has
dropped. Our full-employment, free-trade econ-
omy has also delivered 21.6 percent higher real
hourly compensation than a decade ago. Real
median household income continues to trend
upward while the share of households earning
more than $35,000 a year in inflation-adjusted
income continues to climb. While debts have
increased since the mid-1990s, asset values have
increased far more rapidly, improving the median
net worth of American households by almost
one-third. The large majority of Americans,
including the typical middle-class family, is mea-
surably better off today after a decade of healthy
trade expansion.
Those who blame trade for “declining real
wages” and a “shrinking middle class” are guilty
at the very least of a lack of perspective. They
have confused the passing pain of a cyclical
downturn with the long-term, ongoing, upward
trend in U.S. living standards. Trade cannot be
blamed for causing recessions. Even the best
economists have not figured out how to repeal
the business cycle. Trade does, however, boost
the overall productivity of the economy and
individual workers, allowing more goods and
services to be produced in an average hour of
work, leading to higher real compensation per
hour and a higher median household income
than if our economy were less open to trade. In
part because of expanding trade, American fam-
ilies emerge from each recession and recovery in
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a better place economically than they would be
without trade.
For political and ideological reasons, oppo-
nents of trade liberalization have sought to
exploit temporary downturns in the U.S. econo-
my to indict the value of trade and trade-
expanding agreements. But when we account
for the passing phases of the business cycle, cur-
rent indicators for worker and household well-
being have continued to follow a long, upward
trend. Trade expansion and growing globaliza-
tion have helped raise the standard of living for
a broad swath of Americans.To promote further
progress for American workers and households,
Congress and the administration should pursue
policies that expand the freedom of Americans
to participate in global markets.
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